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“Some Religious Advice and Guidelines to the 
Jihadists of Nigeria” (Nasa’ih wa-tawjihat shar‘iyya 
li-mujahidi Nijiriya) is a short treatise of about 47 
pages in length, originally written in late 2011 by 
Abu al-Hasan Rashid al-Bulaydi. Al-Bulaydi, who 
was one of the leading officials of AQIM (Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb), was later killed in 2015 
during an operation of the Algerian military in 
Tizi-Ouzou (Kabylie). The book had been written in 
response to a series of concerns raised by a network 
of Nigerian Jihadists with links to the Saharan 
branch of AQIM. These concerns, written in the 
form of a letter, had been personally entrusted to 
Abd al-Hamid Abu Zayd (born Mohamed Ghadir), 
who had transmitted them to al-Bulaydi. Until his 
death in 2013 in northern Mali during fighting 
with French and Chadian troops, Abu Zayd had 
been one of the top commanders of AQIM in the 
Sahara.
Al-Bulaydi’s text was recently published 
by an al-Qaeda-linked platform, Mu’assasat Al-
Andalus, in April 2017.1 The text is preceded by 
a rich, 17-page introduction penned by Abu 
Nu’man Qutayba al-Shinqiti, on which this paper 
will focus. It is in the introduction, in fact, more 
than in the actual text of the epistle, that the 
observer can find a rare window to glance into 
the international connections nurtured over the 
years by Nigerian Jihadi cells, as seen through the 
eyes of their Saharan partners. Over the last few 
years, such connections have been the subject of a 
heated debate in the scholarship on Boko Haram. 
On the one hand, some authors, although their 
interpretations do not always entirely coincide, 
have argued that these links should be central to 
any attempt to understand the evolution of the 
phenomenon.2 On the other hand are authors who 
insist that such links only had a peripheral role, 
and that the Boko Haram phenomenon should 
be understood primarily in the light of the local 
context of Nigeria.3
The authors of this paper were able to carefully 
study this document only in early 2018, while the 
publication of ARIA 2017 was already in its final 
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stages, and decided to submit a detailed summary 
of it. This paper will follow a focused descriptive 
method and will refrain from discussing evidence 
of links between Nigerian Jihadis and their global 
counterparts provided by sources other than this 
document, unless this becomes necessary in order 
to make a specific point.4 This paper was submitted 
before either of the authors could see the two 
most recent (and probably, most important) 
books on the topic, Boko Haram: The History of an 
African Jihadist Movement by Alex Thurston, and 
The Boko Haram Reader, by Abdulbasit Kassim and 
Michael Nwankpa.5 Both these books mention the 
text discussed here. However, neither of them 
provides a full summary of it.
While the goal of this paper is more empirical 
than interpretative, it is important to start by 
stressing that we will choose to avoid as far as 
possible the use of the term Boko Haram. The 
authors have serious doubts about the heuristic 
usefulness of this term, mainly for the following 
reasons.6
1. As is well known, “Boko Haram” is not, and has 
never been, the self-designation of any Jihadi 
organisation active in Nigeria. The term is a 
derogatory nickname originally introduced by 
mainstream Nigerian Salafi discourses in the 
mid-2000s, in an effort to delegitimise their 
Jihadi counterparts by focusing the attention of 
the Nigerian Muslim public on the weakest point 
of their ideology (the religious ban on Nigerian 
government schools), while at the same time 
glossing over its two most fundamental aspects 
(the prohibition of constitutional democracy and 
the connection to international Jihadi trends). 
2. The ties between a group of Nigerian Jihadists 
and their Algerian counterparts, discussed 
in this paper, date to a time that predates 
by several years the first appearance of the 
term “Boko Haram” in the Nigerian press and 
popular discourses. Even if one had to accept the 
popular label “Boko Haram” as a designation 
of the organisation led by Muhammad Yusuf in 
the mid-2000s, one would still need to invent 
another suitable term for its precursor cells. 
3. The 2012 split between the Jihadi group led by 
Yusuf’s official successor Abubakar Shekau, and 
a group of Yusuf’s followers loyal to AQIM, led by 
Khalid al-Barnawi and self-designated as Ansar 
al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (usually abbreviated 
as Ansaru), has been widely documented in the 
literature.7 Media discourses, however, have 
continued to use “Boko Haram” as an umbrella 
term for both groups, creating additional 
confusion. Adherence to the general umbrella 
term “Jihadism” and the use of “Ansaru” (or 
AQIM-linked) and “Shekau’s group” for the 
two major organisational structures present in 
the Nigerian territory, will help to clear some 
of the confusion created by the term “Boko 
Haram,” which wrongly suggests the existence 
of one Nigerian Jihadi structure with a single 
strategy and a coherent theology.
4. A more recent defection from Shekau, by 
a group of Jihadists led by Abu Mus’ab al-
Barnawi and claiming loyalty to ISIS, has also 
been documented;8 this development further 
empties the umbrella term “Boko Haram” of 
any empirical content.
After these preliminary observations, this paper 
will now proceed to a detailed summary of al-
Shinqiti’s “Introduction” to al-Bulayidi’s text. The 
body of information provided in the “Introduction” 
is based, in the words of its author, on “oral 
sources from reliable witnesses” who participated 
in making these exchanges, as well as on “letter 
exchanges [between leaders of AQIM and Nigerian 
Jihadists] preserved in my personal archive” 
(p. 1). This paper will attempt to summarise as 
much as possible of the “Introduction to Some 
Advice and Guidelines.” Although al-Bulaydi’s 
text was conceived as a set of guidelines for the 
Nigerian Jihadists loyal to AQIM, al-Shinqiti’s 
introduction unintendedly provides an invaluable 
set of guidelines for the historians to understand 
the history of the “Boko Haram phenomenon.” 
The interpretation of the effects of the links 
between AQIM and their Nigerian partners on 
the development of Jihad in Nigeria certainly 
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remains open to question, and other sources 
might well provide legitimate counter-arguments 
to our ultimate conviction that the links between 
Nigerian and international Jihadis constitute a 
fundamental part of the contemporary history 
of Islam in Nigeria. However, by following the 
“guidelines” provided by al-Shinqiti’s text, 
historians can find a path to some consensus 
around the basic chronology of such connections. 
While the discussion of interpretative matters 
remains open as in every historical debate, al-
Shinqiti’s guidelines might help us to find some 
shared empirical grounds to continue the debate 
about the history of the elusive Nigerian Jihadi 
organisation(s) in a constructive way. 
Beginnings
According to al-Shinqiti, the first contacts between 
an unspecified number of Nigerians and the 
Algerian Jihadi organisations that would develop 
in 1998 into GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat) and later (2007) into AQIM, are older than 
has been argued to date, even by those observers 
who were advancing the hypothesis that the 
history of “Boko Haram” needs to be read in the 
light of such international links. It is important to 
note, however, that for a long time, these links did 
not translate into the opening of a new front of 
Jihad in Nigeria:
The affiliation of the Nigerian brothers to 
the Jihad in the Sahara is old, and it predates 
the link of the Jihadi brothers in the Sahara 
with Nigeria. It is a link whose threads were 
woven starting from the year 1994 onwards. 
A number of them were martyred in this 
[Saharan] front, either in Mali, Niger or 
Algeria – we ask God to have mercy on them 
and to elevate their station in Paradise. (p. 
6, fn 2).
No evidence, on the contrary, is provided by the 
“Introduction” on possible contacts entertained 
between Algerian Jihadis and Muhammad Yusuf 
during the most critical years of the latter’s 
rise to prominence in Nigeria (2005-2009). The 
“Introduction” remains silent concerning those 
critical years. As early as October 2009, the 
Nigerian Salafi scholar Muhammad Awwal al-
Albani, who would be murdered in 2014, had 
argued that organic links existed between Yusuf 
and “a group in Algeria.”9 While he may have 
well known something about the matter, it is 
also possible that, having become aware of the 
contacts established in August 2009 between some 
of Yusuf’s followers and AQIM-Sahara (which will 
be detailed in the next section of this paper), he 
was projecting them back to previous years.
The Pact: 2009
The July-August 2009 crackdown by the Nigerian 
government on the network that had been led by 
Muhammad Yusuf in the mid-2000s, is obviously 
the most important turning point in the history of 
contemporary (local and global) Jihad in Nigeria. 
From the “Introduction,” we learn that less than a 
month after the death of Yusuf on 30 July 2009,and 
the subsequent succession of Shekau as the new 
leader, a delegation of three representatives of 
the Nigerian Jihadi community (named as Abu 
Muhammad, “the trip’s appointed leader,” Khalid 
al-Barnawi and Abu Rayhana) reached out to Abd 
al-Hamid Abu Zayd, commander of AQIM in the 
Sahara. They then asked for the establishment of 
an organic link and for assistance in re-organising 
the Nigerian Jihadi forces after the blow inflicted 
by the Nigerian government.
The fact that the three Nigerians had to “apply 
for” an affiliation to AQIM suggests that, over the 
previous years, Yusuf might not have entertained 
an organic link to the Algeria-based franchise of Al-
Qaeda; that he was not recognised as one of AQIM’s 
official representatives; and that he was acting 
independently. Nevertheless, the immediacy of the 
visit, which took place shortly before 24 August, 
suggests that the links maintained with AQIM-
Sahara during the previous years by at least some 
of Yusuf’s men, was an organic one: how else, in 
fact, could this group be able, in such a short time, 
to locate, and to be allowed face-to-face contact 
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with, the leadership of a secretive underground 
organisation such as AQIM? 
After receiving the visitors, Abd al-Hamid Abu 
Zayd wrote a letter to Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadud 
(Abdelmalik Droukdel), the central commander 
of AQIM. In his letter, Abu Zayd summarised the 
requests of the Nigerian delegation, specifying 
that the three delegates were already well-known 
to him (fa-nahnu na‘rifuhum ma’rifatan jayyidatan), 
as they had previously fought in the Katibat 
(battalion) Tareq Bin Ziyad, which he personally 
commanded.
From the full text of Abu Zayd to Droukdel, 
reported by al-Shinqiti, we learn that the Nigerians 
had asked the following:
• The establishment of an organic connection 
between their leader (at the time, Shekau) 
and the AQIM leadership structure, to be 
maintained through a middleman in Niger.
• Assistance in the form of cash and weapons.
• Assistance in the form of military training in 
the Sahara for groups of Nigerian Jihadis.
• Advice on the feasibility of opening a new 
Jihadi front in Nigeria.
Abu Zayd remained vague on the issue of training 
Nigerian Jihadis in the Sahara, waiting for a clear 
directive by Droukdel on the matter. However, 
he reassured his Nigerian visitors about the 
possibility of establishing a connection with the 
leadership of AQIM, saying that the matter was 
“easy and possible to realise at any time” (p. 2). 
As for the establishment of a liaison in Niger, he 
stated that this also would be an easy matter, 
subject to the following provisos: any liaison 
would be short-lived; its identity and location 
were to be kept as secret as possible even among 
the members of the Jihadi community; and, the 
matter would never be put in writing in order to 
prevent the leaking of the secret outside the inner 
circle of the organisation.10
One week later (10 Ramadan 1430 / 31 August 
[appearing as September — probably a mistake 
— in our text] 2009), Droukdel responded to Abu 
Zayd with a letter, a long section of which is also 
reported in al-Shinqiti’s “Introduction.” In his 
response, Droukdel seemed to incline towards 
delegating to his Saharan deputies, as much as 
possible, the affairs of the new Jihadi franchise 
south of the Sahara. He confirmed his willingness 
to support the Nigerian jihadists financially, but 
stressed that AQIM was undergoing some financial 
hardship and that the amount to be transferred 
to the Nigerians would have to be decided by the 
commander of the Saharan branch. Likewise, he 
agreed to train Nigerian militants in the ranks of 
AQIM-Sahara, but delegated the decision about 
their number, as well as the duration of their 
stay, to “the brothers who are responsible for the 
Southern region” (p. 4). Similarly, Droukdel agreed 
on the establishment of a liaison, but left the exact 
choice of the location (Niger or elsewhere) to the 
new partners who would have better knowledge 
of the territory. Referring to the requests of the 
Nigerian Jihadists, Droukdel confirmed that 
the easiest one to satisfy was the provision of 
weapons; however, he postponed any decision 
about the exact nature and number of weapons to 
be delivered, to a forthcoming consultation with 
the treasurers of the organisation.
The Emir of AQIM then referred to the last, and 
perhaps the most important, of the “questions from 
Nigeria” transmitted through Abu Zayd. He started 
his answer by expressly discouraging the Nigerian 
delegation from prematurely declaring a Jihad 
against the Nigerian state without the necessary 
preparation and without consultation with the 
global leadership of the Jihadi community. The 
Nigerian Muslim community, argued Droukdel, 
had to embrace gradually the ideology of the 
Jihadists, and the latter had to prepare militarily 
before starting an open war. But if the Nigerian 
brothers, continued Droukdel, 
…want to start their Jihad, we cannot but 
bless their decision, while at the same time 
advising them to concentrate on specific 
operations in major urban centres, targeted 
at the leaders of crime [i.e., top government 
institutions], at western expatriates and 
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at the organisations devoted to spreading 
Christianity amongst the Muslims; all of 
this while carefully avoiding to expose the 
Muslims and the weaker members of society 
to any risk (p. 4).
Following this exchange with his senior, Abu Zayd 
came to define an agreement with the Nigerian 
delegation, which he formally stipulated in a new 
document dated 26 Dhu’l Hijja 1430 (13 December 
2009), addressed personally to Abu Bakr Shekau as 
“my representative” (mumaththili). The agreement 
stated the following:
• the number of Nigerians to be trained by AQIM-
Sahara was not to be subject to any limitation 
in number; 
• the number of Nigerians who would return to 
their country of origin after training was set 
at a specific limit (which, however, al-Shinqiti 
prefers to keep confidential); 
• the expenses of their journeys were to be taken 
charge of by AQIM-Sahara; 
• the trainees would be bound to obedience to 
their trainers; 
• the specific mandate of the man in charge of 
the Nigerian trainees was defined in detail;
• and a number of other points that al-Shinqiti 
prefers to omit.
In sum, AQIM had welcome the new partnership 
with the Nigerian Jihadi group led by Shekau, but 
had tried to put in place some measures that would 
allow the Algerian leadership to keep control 
of its new sub-Saharan franchise. The second of 
the points above (the limitation of the number 
of trainees who would go back to Nigeria) is 
particularly interesting, as it suggests that AQIM’s 
primary goal was to use the contact in Nigeria to 
fill its ranks with additional military manpower, 
and not to open a new front of Jihad. 
Logistic Support: 2010-2011
The pact established between AQIM-Sahara and 
the Nigerian Jihadis, with the blessing of AQIM-
central, seems to have worked for some time:
And thus, droves of youth from Nigeria started 
to reach the Sahara in order to undergo 
training, coming in tens. In the Sahara, these 
brothers would receive training and be sent 
back, while the Nigerian brothers who had 
previously been part of the cadres [of AQIM] 
in the Sahara, also returned there, being 
subsumed under the overall leadership of 
Abu Bakr Shekau (p. 6).
Besides the military training, some form of 
financial assistance was also provided during the 
same years. As a witness to this, al-Shinqiti cites 
the text of a brief letter from Droukdel to Abu 
Zayd, dated 23 Rajab 1431 (5 July 2010), in which 
the leader of AQIM had instructed his Saharan 
deputy to send “the Nigerian brothers” the sum of 
200,000 euro and added that he was “looking into 
the possibility of adding [to this sum]” (p. 6).
Weapons were also transferred to the 
Nigerian group, probably through the middlemen 
operating in Niger. For example, al-Shinqiti 
mentions that the weapons stolen by AQIM from 
the Mauritanian army during the September 
2010 battle of Hassi Sidi, in which al-Shinqiti had 
personally participated, were transferred to the 
Nigerians. The latter had also contributed to the 
battle of Hassi Sidi with a contingent of more than 
twenty men, out of a total of eighty-one Jihadists 
participating in the attack. By 2010, the “Nigerian 
unit” had already become one of the biggest of 
AQIM, and was being used primarily, as per Abu 
Zayd’s original plan, to carry out operations in the 
Saharan front. 
On 28 Shawwal 1431 (10 October 2010), 
Shekau wrote a long letter to his “uncle” Abu 
Zayd, thanking him for the support. The letter, 
whose full text is provided by al-Shinqiti in the 
“Introduction” (pp. 7-10), already shows some sign 
of Shekau’s characteristic, grotesque style, which 
would become a veritable signature of the Nigerian 
Jihadi leader through the videos he would release 
during the following years. Shekau’s unnecessary 
display of learned references to the canonical texts 
of Hadith, and his disproportionately verbose 
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conclusive prayers, stand in sharp contrast to the 
eloquent but essential literary style of all the other 
epistles appearing in the exchanges reported by 
al-Shinqiti. Turning what was supposed to be 
a devoted letter of thanks to a superior into an 
impromptu mosque sermon, Shekau’s style must 
have sounded deeply irritating to Abu Zayd.
From the preceding discussion, we can conclude 
that for about two years, the Nigerian Jihadi group 
led by Shekau tried to promote itself as a sub-Saharan 
partner of AQIM, through the mediation of AQIM-
Sahara. Operations such as the 2010 Christmas Eve 
bombings in Jos (which targeted Christian areas), 
the kidnappings of westerners McManus and 
Lamolinara (May 2011), the bombing of the Abuja 
police headquarters (June 2011), the bombing of 
the UN headquarters in Abuja (August 2011), and 
the bombing of churches in Madalla (December 
2011), are clearly in line with the instructions sent 
by Droukdel to his Nigerian partners. The AQIM 
leaders certainly observed these developments 
with keen interest. At the same time, however, 
they maintained a cautious stance, for reasons 
that are quite easy to understand. The letter from 
Shekau had already displayed signs of his unstable 
personality and of his unreliable character. And 
more importantly, the opening of a new front of 
all-out Jihad was not considered to be a priority 
by al-Qaeda at the time, for it carried the risk of 
draining its resources and further fragmenting its 
already loose sub-networks. 
The Rift
And this state of affairs went on, with 
delegations [of Nigerians] coming [to the 
Sahara], receiving training and travelling 
back with weapons, money and logistic 
support. This, until some issues started 
to be raised about Abu Bakr Shekau, in 
particular concerning his sanctioning of the 
confiscation of the properties of the Muslim 
commoners, on the grounds that they had 
chosen to live under the government of the 
unbelievers (p. 10).
The unhappiness of the Nigerian Jihadists loyal to 
AQIM with the extremism of Shekau, was raised 
very early, while the logistic coordination between 
AQIM-Sahara and the Nigerian Jihadists, described 
above, was still taking place. Already towards the 
end of the year 1431 (2010), Shaykh Abdallah Abu 
al-Hasan al-Shinqiti, a Mauritanian scholar of 
AQIM, wrote to Shekau stating his views on the 
controversial points of the latter’s interpretation 
of the Salafi canon on takfir (“declaration of 
unbelief”) (p. 10). Shekau, however, “did not 
benefit from this letter, continued to declare the 
properties of Muslims as a legitimate booty of 
war, and the first signs of deviancy and extremism 
started to appear from him, while being opposed 
by a group belonging to the inner circle [of the 
organisation]” (p. 10). Abu al-Hasan al-Shinqiti’s 
letter had been prompted by an earlier critique 
of Shekau, written as a full-length treatise by 
a Nigerian, Abu Muslim al-Ibrahimi, whom the 
author of the “Introduction” mentions as Shaykh, 
describing him as “one of the exemplary seekers 
of knowledge in the Jihadi trend” (p. 10, fn. 2). Al-
Ibrahimi, believes the author, was later killed by 
Shekau around the year 2012. A long citation of 
al-Ibrahimi’s treatise, which was titled Tanbihat 
muhimma ‘ala akhta’ man khalafa al-a’imma wa-
’stabaha dima’ wa-amwal al-umma, is also included 
in the “Introduction” (pp. 10-11, fn. 3). In this 
fragment, al-Ibrahimi laments the extremism of 
Shekau, while claiming his adherence to the path 
of “the moderates” (al-munsifin).
The polemical engagements between the 
“moderates” loyal to AQIM’s vision and the 
“extremists” loyal to Shekau extended over 
a relatively long period of time and was even 
brought up to the top levels of AQIM. On 22 Dhul-
Hijja 1432 (18 November 2011), the supreme Qadi 
(legal authority) of AQIM, Shaykh Abd al-Rahman 
Ishaq, had to intervene in the dispute by writing 
an epistle in support of the position of al-Ibrahimi 
and his group.
By the end of 2011, the ideological rift between 
the two Nigerian Jihadi groups (the would-be 
Ansaru, loyal to AQIM; and Shekau’s group, more 
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extreme) had become irreversible. In the words 
of the author of the “Introduction,” “the matter 
culminated in the decision of those who rejected 
Shekau’s extremism to separate from him and to 
withdraw from his group, so that some of them 
could form a new group” (p. 12). Many of the latter 
– continues al-Shinqiti – would be eventually 
killed by Shekau.
The differences between the two groups 
translated immediately into the adoption of 
different strategies. The January 2012 bombings 
in Kano, in which over two hundred people, 
mainly Muslim civilians, lost their lives, bear the 
signature of Shekau’s new strategy and indicate 
that by then, AQIM had virtually lost control over 
a large part of the Nigerian Jihadi landscape. After 
all, Droukdel’s original guidelines sent in 2009, 
had been very clear: yes to attacks on high-profile 
government targets, western expatriates and 
symbols of Christian presence in Muslim areas; 
no to the targeting of Muslim civilians which 
would alienate the Muslim masses from the Jihadi 
project.
After the above review of the history of the 
relationship between AQIM and the Nigerian 
Jihadis, al-Shinqiti’s “Introduction” to al-Bulaydi’s 
treatise concludes with the long text (pp. 12-18) 
of a final letter from a delegation representing 
the Nigerian Jihadis who were disaffected with 
Shekau’s extremism. Al-Bulaydi would eventually 
respond to this letter with his “Religious Advice and 
Guidelines to the Nigerian Jihadists.” In his treatise 
(which we will not discuss here), al-Bulaydi would 
attempt to strengthen the “moderate” position 
of the “defectors,” by providing theological 
justifications for their stance. 
The letter to al-Bulaydi is signed by eleven men, 
all Nigerians. Their nisba-s (al-Kashinawi, from 
Katsina; al-Ukinawi, from Okene; al-Kanawi, from 
Kano; al-Yarwawi, from Maiduguri; al-Bawshawi, 
from Bauchi) show that the organisation included 
a diverse leadership representing several northern 
Nigerian states. Their titles (Army General; 
Commander-in-chief of the northern Region; 
Commander of the Tariq Bin Ziyad Battalion; 
Commander of the al-Bara’ bin Malik Battalion; 
Commander of the Nur al-Din Battalion; Member 
of the Council for Research and Fatwas; Member 
of the Shura Council; Leader of the Department 
for Guidance and Propagation; Commander of the 
Mus’ab bin ‘Umayr Battalion) indicate that the 
organisational structure of the group was quite 
sophisticated. The letter, addressed to Shaykh 
Abdallah al-Shinqiti, is not dated. According to 
the author of the “Introduction,” it was written 
at the beginning of the year 1433 (end of 2011). As 
it starts with the greetings for Eid, which fell at 
the beginning of November 2011, it was probably 
written before the end of the month of November.
Once again, the letter starts by claiming to 
represent the point of view of a “moderate path” 
(al-minhaj al-mutawassit al-qawim) in Salafi-Jihadi 
thought. Conversely, the extremism of Shekau is 
understood as emanating from an alternative set 
of references within Salafi-Jihadi literature. In the 
letter, the delegation makes reference to Shekau’s 
position that, when it comes to issues of shirk al-
abkar (major polytheism), the excuse of ignorance 
(al-‘udhr bil-jahl) cannot be applied, and argues 
that Shekau was drawing on a set of sources 
which included the writings of the Saudi scholar 
Ali al-Khudair, and those of Diya’ al-Din al-Qudusi 
(a pseudonym used by an author of Salafi-Jihadi 
literature). Those sources were being used by 
Shekau to apply too loosely the principle (drawn 
from the Nawaqidh al-Islam, a brief text written by 
the eponym of the Wahhabi school), according to 
which “whoever does not declare an unbeliever 
to be an unbeliever, is himself an unbeliever.” By 
loosely applying this principle, Shekau is accused 
of arriving at the paradox of declaring even Yusuf, 
the deceased founder of the group, as an unbeliever, 
for having refused to declare the Nigerian Muslim 
masses as unbelievers on the basis of their 
failure to denounce the Nigerian government as 
such. Showing a remarkable awareness of the 
developments in the Jihadi landscape of Algeria, 
the letter adds that it seems “as if Shekau was 
schooled by al-Zouabri,” the former leader of the 
GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), who in the 1990s, 
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had been rejected for his extremism by the would-
be founders of AQIM.
Shekau – adds the delegation – kills all the 
Jihadists who disagree with his decisions, and 
confiscates the weapons of those whom he 
considers to be insubordinate (p. 14). Underlying 
the letter is a subtle but clear sub-text that suggests 
that its authors were developing the suspicion 
that Shekau was, consciously or unconsciously, 
doing the work of the intelligence agencies trying 
to undermine al-Qaeda’s plans in Nigeria. While 
AQIM had advised caution and good preparation 
before opening new fronts of Jihad, Shekau’s 
actions were characterised by “improvisation in 
military matters” (p. 16). While AQIM wanted to 
capitalise on the mobility of the members of the 
Jihadi constituencies under its control to strike 
globally, Shekau strictly controlled the movements 
of his followers and prevented “any member of 
his group from traveling to other lands of Jihad 
like Somalia and Algeria” (p. 15). While AQIM, in 
its earlier advice to the Nigerian Jihadists, had 
prioritised a long-term strategy based on learning 
and consultation, Shekau systematically alienated 
the scholarly elite and the founding fathers of the 
group, to the point that “we are not aware of the 
existence, amongst those who are close to him, of 
any of those who used to be renowned for their 
teaching or their zeal in search for knowledge” 
(p. 15). While AQIM had called for a strategy of 
soft propaganda intended at gradually drawing 
the Muslim masses towards sympathising with 
the Jihadi camp, Shekau’s actions were leading 
to diametrically opposite results: the Jihadi 
community in Nigeria was fragmenting into a 
number of competing factions, and many former 
members were abandoning Jihad altogether out 
of disillusionment; at the same time, the Muslim 
masses were starting to incline towards the 
Murji’ites (i.e. the religious scholars who oppose 
Jihad), for they had lost their confidence in the reli-
gious legitimacy of the Jihadi organisation (p. 16). 
As if all of these issues were not enough, while 
AQIM had indicated the need to implement a 
strict respect for the rule of secrecy among the 
members of the inner circle, Shekau was allowing 
the secrets of the organisation to be disclosed to 
outsiders: 
…he has uncovered the secrets and torn 
apart the veil… And in addition to that, he 
has released three recordings called al-Bayan 
al-kamil [“The full explanation”], in which he 
spared no effort to bring everything to light! 
These recordings are now in the hands of 
the tyrant [i.e., the Nigerian security]!! And 
as a consequence of this, we had to forfeit 
some of our plans, and some of our leaders 
were arrested by the tyrants… (p. 15).
Conclusion: Boko Haram as a failed
al-Qaeda story
The epistolary exchanges discussed in this paper 
unveil a history of intense interaction between a 
community of Nigerian Jihadists and the Sahara-
based branch of al-Qaeda, which took place 
between 2009 and 2011. This interaction was part 
of a longer history of contacts established as early 
as the mid-1990s. Today, it is hard to deny that 
an embryonic base of the global Jihadi movement 
existed in Nigeria well before the 2009 crackdown 
on Muhammad Yusuf, and we believe that it is only 
by taking this fact seriously, that the successive 
history of global and local manifestations of 
Jihadism in Nigeria can be understood. This 
does not mean, however, that the “Boko Haram 
phenomenon” should be seen as the linear outcome 
of the penetration of al-Qaeda in the Nigerian 
landscape. Al-Qaeda’s experience in Nigeria was 
marked by discontinuities and hesitations more 
than by linearity and resoluteness. The most 
famous contemporary international Jihadist 
organisation (at least before the emergence of the 
Islamic State) did not enter an empty Nigerian 
arena. Instead, it met a multiplicity of local forces 
that collectively shaped the development of the 
elusive phenomenon that has come to be known 
by the world as “Boko Haram.” Moreover, the 
path threaded by al-Qaeda in the Nigerian arena 
also crossed, unavoidably, those of other global 
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forces, including (1) the multiple actors engaged 
in the War on Terror with its complex, and often 
secretive calculations and (2) rival, more extreme 
trends in Salafi-Jihadi theology. The face of the 
“Boko Haram phenomenon” that has come to be 
known by the world as its most iconic image, that 
of the erratic and unaccountable Abu Bakr Shekau, 
does not represent the culmination of al-Qaeda’s 
success in Nigeria, but the incipient manifestation 
of the failure of its strategy.
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